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We investigate the strategic role of correlation between disclosure error and payoff shock in 
affecting a firm’s cost of capital or share price. We show that the correlation affects the 
relationship between disclosure quality and th cost of capital or share price. The standard result 
where disclosure quality unambiguously lowers the firm’s cost of capital or share price can be 
observed only in the case where the correlation is zero.  In the extreme case where the 
correlation is perfect, disclosure quality does not affect the cost of capital or share price. When 
compared to other non-perfect correlation cases, the extreme case where the correlation is 
perfect results in, on average, a higher share price. This implies that the firm can achieve a 
higher share price by influencing the correlation (i.e., making it nonzero) and suggests a new 









The literature on the relationship of disclosure quality and the cost of capital is large but still 
growing. Conventional wisdom suggests that more disclosure reduces information asymmetry 
and thus lowers the risk premium embedded in the cost of capital. But research of the last few 
decades cannot come to any definite answer on this issue.  This issue still remains controversial 
at both theory and empirical levels. For a recent review of this literature, see Artiach and 
Clarkson (2011). 
Our paper takes a new theoretical approach to examine this issue. We use a simple setting 
where there is only a single firm with many investors in an infinite period world. There is only a 
single disclosure/signal /management earnings forecast made by the firm.1 But this disclosure is 
not perfect and noisy. We consider the strategic role of the correlation of the noise of this 
disclosure with that of the firm’s payoff which we label as payoff shock. The strategic role of 
this correlation has been largely ignored in the literature. We show that this strategic role turns 
out to be very important in determining the relationship between disclosure quality and the 
cost of capital. In particular, we show that some standard results that the literature has 
established in this setting are only valid when the correlation is zero. Compared to the zero-
correlation case, we show that as long as the correlation is non-zero the share price is, on 
average, higher. In the extreme cases where the correlation is perfect, disclosure quality does 
not matter as it has no effect on the cost of capital.   
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it is the first paper which highlights the 
strategic role of manipulating the correlation between the disclosure (or signal) noise and that 
of the firm’s payoff in the information disclosure or signalling literature in general and the 
management earnings forecast literature in particular. We show that it is always desirable for 
the firm to make the signal noise correlated with that of its payoff because by doing so the 
share price will be, on average, higher. The literature usually measures the performance of a 
disclosure (or signal or management earnings forecast) in terms of bias (i.e., the difference 
between the disclosed (or forecasted) value and the actual value) or quality (i.e., precision). Our 
result opens up a new way to capture the "effectiveness" of disclosure (or management 
earnings forecast) by measuring the correlation between its bias and payoff shock because the 
higher the correlation is, the more effective the disclosure (or signal or forecast) will be.  This 
measure is easy to use and interpret. Second, we also establish that the impact of disclosure 
quality on the firm’s cost of capital is ambiguous and depends on the correlation. Our results 
nest that of Clinch (2013) which assumes that the correlation is zero and are consistent with 
that of Lambert et al. (2007). Third, we also derive in terms of the correlation a new set of 
conditions under which disclosure quality does not affect the cost of capital. These conditions 
reveal that disclosure quality does not matter if the correlation is perfect, (i.e., either positive 
one or negative one). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly review the literature and compare 
our approach with other existing approaches. Second, the basic setting of our model is outlined. 
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Third, we show and discuss the main results. Finally, we conclude the paper with some 
discussions. 
2. Literature review 
Lambert et al. (2007) show that there are two effects associated with a change in disclosure 
quality. First, there is a direct effect because higher (lower) quality disclosure reduces 
(increases) a firm’s covariance with those of the market as perceived by investors.  Second, an 
indirect effect is expected because higher (lower) quality disclosure also affects the firm’s real 
decisions that impact its expected cash flows and their covariance. Note that the direct effect is 
non-diversifiable while the indirect effect is diversifiable. In general, an increase in disclosure 
quality may affect the cost of capital in an ambiguous way as its overall effect depends on the 
term (  where  and  represent the expected payoff of the firm and the covariance of 
the firm’s payoff with those of the market (see Proposition 4, Lambert et al. (2007)). They also 
derive the cases under which disclosure quality leads to a decrease in the cost of capital. A well-
known and much discussed case in the literature is found whenever disclosure quality only 
leads to an decrease in  but no corresponding decrease in , then a decrease in the firm’s cost 
of capital is expected.2  
However, Christensen et al. (2010) shows in a finite period model that ex ante cost of capital is 
not affected by disclosure quality. In their model, there are two offsetting effects associated 
with a change in disclosure quality.  The first effect reduces the perceived risk in relation to the 
expected terminal payoff of the firm, while the second effect increases the volatility of the 
security price of the firm. They offset each other, resulting in little change in the cost of capital.  
Clinch (2013) argues that Christensen et al. (2010)’s finite-period model cannot capture price 
uncertainty because an investor who lives and holds shares for the entire period will not face 
the price uncertainty arising from the final payoff of the firm. He comes up with an infinite 
period model and shows that ex ante cost of capital is decreasing in the quality of disclosure.  
The basic setting of Lambert et al. (2007) has been extended to various directions or settings 
that highlight some new conditions under which disclosure quality may or may not affect the 
cost of capital. For examples, Clinch (2013) discusses the issue in a multi-firm setting, with 
multiple signals/disclosures, or with the presence of heuristic traders. Given the fact that Clinch 
(2013)'s approach is quite flexible and versatile, our paper employs its basic setting which is 
described as below.  
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 Johnstone (2013a, 2013b) observe that the current literature focuses too much on disclosure quality () without 
a proper regard on how information can affect expected payoff (). Bad (good) information can affect both  and 
 (and their relative change as well) at the same time. He shows that even in the framework of Lambert et al. 
(2007), information disclosure can affect both  and  simultaneously, it is possible that information can lead to a 





3. Model setting  
We follow the basic setting of Clinch (2013) which assumes a single firm in a infinite-period 
model. The firm generates a payoff, , which follows a random walk, that is: 
        (1) 
where  is a random payoff shock normally distributed with mean zero, variance, , and 
independent over time.  There is also a riskfree security that pays  each period. Thus,  
represents the risk-free rate of return. In each period , there are  identical and price taking 
investors, each with negative exponential utility with risk aversion parameter . Investors are 
assumed to exist for only a single period, at the end of which they liquidate their positions and 
consume the proceeds, which comprise the firm’s payoff , plus the price, , at which they 
sell their shares (to the next generation of investors). Finally, the supply of the firm’s security is 
normalized to one (and constant over time). 
Remark 1:  In this setting, the firm’s payoff  represents the dividend rather than firm earnings 
because any plow-backed earnings cannot be consumed by the investors at time . 
Remark 2:  In some cases, the amount of rights issues could exceed the distributed dividends. 
Hence, this may result in negative dividend payments. 
We assume there are two types of players: the firm and investors.  
1. The firm can observe the income at that time based on which they decide the dividend 
of next period . Hence to the firm,  is observable at time .  
2. The investors do not know .  
3. Given , the firm will disclose information with   (e.g., management earnings 
forecast), and  
              ,        (2) 
which is the sum of   and noise ,  where   is a normally distributed variable, with 
mean zero, variance , and independent over time. To the firm,  and , are all 
observable at time .  
By equating (1) and (2) together, we get 
 
We can see that both the firm and the investors know  at time , so  is a realized 
fact;  is the increment of payoff from  to , it is known by the firm at time  and 
will be known by the investors at time , and  is the information that the firm 




next payoff  exactly, or they can choose to add noise, which is the case that  
is independent of . But the problem is how to control the amount of the noise 
contained in the signal ? Basically, there are two ways, either the firm makes  
correlated with , or adjust the standard derivation of . The former is the focus of 
this paper while the latter is called information quality  in the literature. As the 
correlation  goes from zero to one, or from zero to negative one, the information 
contained in the signal becomes stronger.  As  shrinks to zero, the noise contained in 
the signal disappears; as  becomes large, the noise will dominate the signal. Note that 
even though  and  are perfectly correlated, it does not necessarily imply that  
and  are the same because  and  may be different. 
4. The investors can only observe ,  and  will not be known until time . In the 
absence of signal , Clinch (2013) shows that  
.    (3) 
      The equation suggests that the current share price is nothing more than the present 
value of the future payoff denoted by the two terms in the bracket. The first term in the 
bracket refers to the investors' expected payoff and the second term stands for the 
variance of such payoff. One may interpret the second term loosely as the discount for 
the risk premium perceived by the investors and view it as a measure of the cost of 
capital. Note that this measure of the cost of capital is inversely related to the share 
price. There are two factors that affect the cost of capital. They are aggregate (or 
average) investors' risk aversion (/n) , and the risk of the future payoff  
. As will be shown later, this risk depends on disclosure quality. 
5. Given signal , the investors forecast by forming conditional (rather than 
unconditional) expectation (i.e., by making a projection) of  on , 
. 
where  is the projection error, which is independent of . 
6. The key difference between this paper and Clinch (2013) is that we allow for the 
correlation  between  and  while Clinch (2013) assumes  and  are independent. 
To account for the possible relationship between the noise   and the payoff shock 
( , we set  
    ,   (4) 
where  is normally distributed with mean zero, variance, .  is independent of , 
and independent over time.  This construction will assure that the correlation between  
 and  is , and the standard deviation of  is .  




cost of capital and  will be determined accordingly. 
8. As the signal affects the cost of capital and , the firm is able to minimize the cost of 
capital and maximize  by choosing  and  optimally.3  
9. Table 1 illustrates the basic structure of our model over the first few time periods. For 
example, given a payoff shock at time 1, the payoff at time 1 will be  
, while the disclosure (or signal) will become 
in general and  if . 
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4. Main results 
We state and discuss the main results in this section. The details of the proofs are shown in the 
Appendix. 
First, we derive a useful lemma which will be used subsequently. 
Lemma 1: If the firm’s payoff   follows a random walk,  then the share price 
follows a random walk. In particular,  
Second, we state two main theorems of the paper here. 
Theorem 1: Under the above assumptions, if we allow for a non-zero correlation between  
and , then the share price is 
   
where , and .  
Remark 3: Note that now the variance of future payoffs  is now a function of .  can 
affects  (and hence share price) directly and indirectly via .  
Remark 4:  If , then  , and . The 
share price will degenerate into Clinch (2013)'s equation (2).  
Remark 5:  Note that  can affect both  and expected future payoff (i.e., ) 
but in opposite ways. Expected future payoff is increasing in  but  is decreasing in . This 
result is consistent with Johnstone (2013b)'s observation that information can affect both expected 
future payoff AND risk at the same time. 
Remark 6:  The firm will not choose a high  to boost up  because this is an infinitely 
repeated game where reputation does matter. If the firm cheats the investors by setting a high 
, the investors will never believe the firm any more. 
Remark 7: To understand the role of  in determining the cost of capital and the share price, it 
is illuminative to consider some special cases of . They refer to the situations where 
  It is easy to get the following results: 
 If , then ,  
 , and 




 If , then , 
 , and 
. 
 If , then , 
 , and 
            
 
   
The above inequality holds because b is always equal to or less than one by construction.  
It is noteworthy that when , the quality of the signal  does not enter into the pricing 
formula. That means, the investors place no concern over  as it does not matter. This result is 
in sharp contrast with the result of Clinch (2013) where the quality of the signal  has a role to 
play in determining the share price. In these two cases, only the payoff shock and its variance, 
together with other variables, determine the share price.  
Theorem 2: If  and  are perfectly correlated, namely , the firm can experience, on 
average, a higher share price when compared to the other imperfect correlation cases. In 
particular,   . 
Remark 8:  The expected share price conditional on perfect correlation is always higher than 
that conditional on other imperfect correlation cases.   
Remark 9: The implication of Theorem 2 is that it does not matter whether or not the 
disclosure or payoff forecast by managers is noisy (i.e.,  > 0 and ). As long as the 
managers can match this noise with that of the firm's payoff in such a way that their correlation 
is perfect, then disclosure quality  does not matter as it does not affect the cost of capital 
and therefore the share price. Two cases can be distinguished. In the first case where  
and  = , the firm can be better off, in terms of reducing the cost of capital, by revealing the 
information to the investor in such a way that the information noise exactly matches the payoff 
shock. In the second case where  and    but , the firm may give either 
an optimistic forecast or pessimistic forecast as long as the firm does it consistently by 
matching the disclosure (or forecast) noise with payoff shock according to equation (4), then 




Remark 10: The prediction of Theorem 2 is consistent with the empirical evidence on the 
relationship between management earnings forecasts and the cost of capital, which generally 
finds that forecast precision does not affect the cost of capital (Kim and Shi, 2011; Baginski and 
Rakow, 2012; Larocque, Lawrence, and Veenstra, 2013). 
Remark 11: This theorem suggests that one may use this correlation to evaluate the 
effectiveness of a particular measure of disclosure/management forecast/signal. The 
correlation measure has a number of advantages. First, it is easy to compute as long as data for 
actual payoff and disclosure/forecast/signal are available. Second, the interpretation of this 
correlation is straightforward; the higher the correlation is, the more effective the measure will 
be in revealing the information. Third, Theorem 2 provides an upper bound of the effectiveness 
of a particular disclosure/management forecast/signal; this bound is also ideal in the sense that 
it is deprived in a setting where we assume away other institutional or behavioural factors like 
agency costs that may move this correlation away from positive (or negative) one. Thus, in 
reality, the correlation is expected to be less than one. Empiricists may explore the possible 
determinants of this correlation.4  
5. Conclusion 
Based on a simple setting of Clinch (2013), we show that the correlation between disclosure 
error and payoff shock turns out to be an important factor that determines the cost of capital 
and share price. The higher the correlation is, the lower, on average, the cost of capital will be 
and therefore the higher the share price. We also show that in general the impact of disclosure 
quality on the cost of capital is ambiguous and depends on, inter alia, the correlation. In the 
extreme cases where the correlation is positively or negatively perfect, our model predicts that 
disclosure quality does not matter. This suggests a strategic role that this correlation may play 
in understanding the effectiveness of a disclosure/signal/earnings forecast. 
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Proof of Lemma 1. 
Proof: 
  
             




   ) 
where  is the stochastic discount factor at time . Note that the first bracket term can be 
simplified as 
 
Substituting the above result into the first equation, we get  
 
By the same token, we may write the stock price at time 1 as follows: 
 
 
By the Markov characteristics of , , thus we have 
 





Proof of Theorem 1. 
Proof: 
                                             (A.1) 
Since , we have 
                           (A.2) 
                    
where  is the intercept, and  is the slope. Hence, we have 
                   (A.3) 
Suppose that the best fitting line across  does exist, then  
                     (A.4) 
where  
Denote  as   and substitute (A.2) and (A.4) into (A.1),  can be simplified into 
                  
                 
                 
Note that we can rewrite   as follows:   
               
To prove this, recall (A.2) implies that   
                 , 
We have  
                 , 
Therefore, 




Using Lemma 1, we rewrite the LHS of the above equation as follows, 
                 , 
Hence, 
                 , 
By cancelling out  from both sides of the equation, we get 
                 , 
                  
                           
                           
Therefore,  












Proof of Theorem 2. 
Proof:  
. 
Substitute  and  into , we have, 
  
      
 
Taking unconditional expectation of , 
. 
By taking the derivative of  with respect to , we get the following:  
  
               
               
             . 
If , then . 
If , then  . 
If , then  . 





Note that  is a (negative) function of , with the value of  being always positive.   is a convex 
quadratic function of , with two roots being  and  .  Hence, no matter whether  , or 
, one root , the other . As the domain of  in our problem is , we 












Figure 1 shows the relationship between   and  from which we derive and show the implied 
relationship between  and  in Figure 2. As  goes from  to , Figure 1 shows that at first  
, and then it becomes ; based on the results in Remark 7, this implies that  
goes from the maximum, , to a minimum and then increases to 
. (See Figure 2)  
As  goes from  to , we always have  (see Figure 1), then Figure 2 shows that  goes 
from  to the maximum,  .5  
This completes the proof. 
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 Note that . Since both   and  are functions of , and  is quadratic function of  while  is 
decreasing in ,  is no longer a quadratic function. However, since  is always positive, the sign of  is 












Artiach, T.C. and Clarkson, P.M. (2011), Disclosure, Conservatism and the Cost of Equity Capital: 
A Review of the Foundation Literature, Accounting and Finance, 51, pp. 2-49. 
Baginski, S.P. and Rakow Jr., K.C. (2012), Management Earnings Forecast Disclosure Policy and 
the Cost of Equity Capital, Review of Accounting Studies 17(2), pp. 279-321. 
Christensen, P.O., de la Rosa, L.E. and Feltham, G.A. (2010), Information and the Cost of Capital: 
An Ex Ante Perspective. Accounting Review, 85, pp. 817-848. 
Clinch, G. (2013), Disclosure quality, diversification and the cost of capital. Australian Journal of 
Management, 38, pp. 475-489. 
Johnstone, D.J. (2013a), Information, Uncertainty and the Cost of Capital in a Mean-Variance 
Efficient Market, Working Paper, University of Sydney. 
Johnstone, D.J. (2013b), The Effect of Information and Certainty and the Cost of Capital, 
Working Paper, University of Sydney. 
Kim, J. W. and Shi, Y. N. (2011), Voluntary Disclosure and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from 
Management Earnings Forecasts, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 30(4), pp 348–366. 
Lambert, R., Leuz, C. and Verrecchia, R.E. (2007), Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the 
Cost of Capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 45, pp. 385-420. 
Larocque, S., Lawrence, A. and Veenstra, K. (2013), Managers’ Cost of Equity Capital Estimates: 









CRAE forms a collaborative 
applied economic research 
framework across Curtin 
University. By developing and 
enhancing new and existing 
research networks, it provides 
facilities for sharing research 
materials and data. CRAE also 
supports ongoing applied 
economic research activities 
relevant to the dynamic economic 
conditions of the local, regional, 
national and international 
concerns of our members through 
inter- and intra-disciplinary 
research. 
Contact: Centre for Research in Applied Economics, School of Economics and Finance, Curtin University, GPO 
Box U1987, Perth, Western Australia 6845. Telephone: 61 8 9266 7305 Facsimile +61 8 9266 3026 Email: 
crae@cbs.curtin.edu.au Web: http://www.curtin.edu.au/research/crae/       
